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1.  Introduction 
There are substantial differences in how different countries regulate financial disclosure 
by private (i.e., non-listed) companies and, in particular, publication of their accounts. In the 
USA, Japan and some other countries, most private companies, whatever their size, are not 
obliged to disclose financial information. In contrast, in the European Union all companies 
are required to file their accounts with a public registry. Most other countries also require 
many of their private companies to publicly file their accounts (UNCTAD, 2005: 92).  
Discussions of these disclosure and publication requirements have led to disparate 
recommendations to slightly expand publication requirements (as in the UK [CLRSG, 2000; 
DTI, 2005]), maintain them (as in Hong Kong [SCCLR, 2000] and Malaysia [CLRC, 2007]) 
and reduce them (as in Australia [PJSCCS, 2001], Singapore [CLRFC, 2002]). More 
recently, as part of its initiative to simplify the business environment and lessen 
administrative burdens, the Commission of the European Communities (2007, 2009a) also 
proposed to exempt small companies so that they would not necessarily be required by 
national law to publish their accounts.1  
Mandatory publication of accounts by private companies relates to several strands of the 
economic, accounting and financial literatures: deregulation of business formalities, 
mandatory financial disclosure, and investors’ protection and credit information. Findings in 
all these areas thus provide complementary insights on the issue under discussion.  
The European Commission aims to improve the environment of businesses by 
simplifying business formalities, a popular policy since the European Charter for Small 
Enterprises (2000) and the efforts of the World Bank through the “Doing Business” project 
(2003-2009). This origin of the initiative explains the focus of the Commission on reducing 
costs practically without considering benefits.2 As we will see, however, mandatory 
                                                 
1 The Commission of the European Communities (2009a) has finally proposed to define a category of 
small companies or “micro entities” that would be exempt from the accounting directives. This 
category of potentially exempted firms would cover companies which on their balance sheet dates do 
not exceed the limits of two of the three following criteria: 500,000 € in assets, 1,000,000 € in net 
turnover and an average of 10 employees in the financial year. In addition, the Commission (2007) 
had initially suggested relieving from publication requirements all “small” companies—that is, those 
meeting at least two of the following three criteria: less than 50 employees, less than 4.4m € in assets 
and less than 8.8m € in turnover. The Commission had also proposed treating medium-sized 
companies without a “particular external user” as small companies. A company would be considered 
medium-sized if it meets at least two of the following three criteria: less than 250 employees, assets 
lower than 17.5m € and turnover lower than 35m €. The number of companies potentially exempted 
would be between 88 and 97% in different EU countries, according to the European Committee of 
Central Balance Sheet Data Offices (ECCBSO, 2007: 3). 
2 According to the Commission, publishing the accounts constitutes a major administrative burden 
but is inconsequential if—when given freedom to disclose or not—small firms choose not to disclose 
because their accounts are only “used by a limited number of stakeholders, such as credit institutions 
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publication of accounts is not only an issue of reducing the costs of operating businesses but 
also of easing businesses’ access to credit. The discussion therefore fits in with the argument 
given by Arruñada (2007, 2009) that simplification policies that narrowly focus on reducing 
the cost of institutional arrangements are counterproductive when they disregard the value of 
the services being provided.  
Furthermore, in the case at hand, other strands of the accounting and finance literatures 
provide complementary perspectives for understanding the costs and benefits involved. Since 
the 1960s, there has been substantial controversy on the balance of costs and benefits and the 
optimal content of mandatory financial disclosure. In the current regulatory framework of the 
USA,3 however, most of these discussions have focused on mandatory disclosure by public 
companies—that is, companies selling shares or bonds to individual investors in stock 
exchanges. These public companies are required by law to not only file financial information 
publicly on a periodic basis but also to disclose other information on the company, provide 
detailed data on new issues of securities and report any trade by insiders.  
Even though most of our discussion will refer to the mandatory publication of annual 
accounts by small private companies, part of the discussion on mandatory disclosure by 
public companies is applicable. Other parts of the analysis are substantially different, 
however, because of differences in the governance structure, size and availability of 
information of both types of companies, as well as differences in the contents of the 
information being mandatorily disclosed. In particular, previous research has focused on how 
mandatory disclosure for public companies affects the value of their equity by facilitating or 
not transactions on such equity. But the main interest for private companies lies in knowing 
how publishing their accounts could help their trading parties (mainly banks and suppliers) 
estimate their credit risk, thus expanding their access to credit and lowering its cost. The main 
effect should be to reduce information asymmetry in credit (including trade credit) 
transactions instead of in equity transactions.  
In addition, given that the shares of public companies are traded in the stock market, it is 
possible to estimate the impact of mandatory disclosure on the value of the public companies. 
However, even if the reduction in the transaction costs of credit caused by mandatory 
publication of accounts also increases firm value, we cannot measure this effect because we 
lack market prices for equity shares in private companies. Therefore, without a 
comprehensive metric for evaluating the impact of mandatory publication of accounts, we 
can only aspire to building an enlightened qualitative inventory of costs and benefits. This 
difference, however, might be less substantial than it seems, as important disagreements 
remain amongst those measuring the effects of mandatory disclosure for public companies,4 
                                                                                                                                                        
and suppliers that have the possibility to require financial information directly from the company” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007: 17). 
3 In the USA, Japan and some other countries most private companies, whatever their size, are not 
obliged to disclose financial information. However, “in most countries, many or even all entities are 
required by national law or regulation to prepare financial statements that conform to a required set of 
generally accepted accounting principles, and for these financial statements to be audited in 
accordance with a required set of generally accepted auditing standards. These audited financial 
statements are normally filed with a government agency and thus are available to creditors, suppliers, 
employees, governments, and others.” (UNCTAD, 2005: 92).  
4 After more than four decades of empirical studies following the pioneer study by Stigler (1964), 
evidence on the effects of mandatory disclosure is mixed. The main studies that avoid confounding 
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to the extent that opinions on mandatory disclosure end up being a matter of qualitative 
judgement.5  
Finally, mandatory financial disclosure may play a key role in economic growth, as it is 
an important element of the legal system intended to protect firms’ transactions with 
investors and creditors. Protecting such transactions plays a crucial role in the development of 
modern financial markets,6 and financial development is an important factor of economic 
growth.7 Most studies focus on public companies trading in the stock market but similar 
claims can be made about private companies, mainly considering the evidence on the cost of 
credit.8 The volume of credit contracted in an economy depends on two factors: information 
available on debtors’ quality,9 and the rights that the legal system grants to creditors in case 
of default.10 For the availability of information, the factor on which we are most interested, 
empirical evidence shows that the volume of credit grows when banks share more 
information on debtors and when the quality of credit registries improves.11 It seems that the 
better the creditors know the quality and record of potential debtors, the lower the transaction 
costs of credit, probably because of both improved debtors’ incentives and easier avoidance 
of adverse selection. As we will see, the main reason for the publication of accounts is that it 
allows improved assessment of credit risk for both individual transactions and bank and 
macroeconomic regulation.  
This article analyses the publication of company accounts and argues that information 
technologies are reducing its costs and increasing its benefits, providing greater justification 
                                                                                                                                                        
the effect of introducing the mandatory disclosure rule with unobserved shocks experienced by all 
companies’ shares are the following. Chow (1983) finds a negative effect on value in a small sample 
of companies after the 1933 Securities Act. Simon (1989) observes a significant decrease in risk (as 
measured by the dispersion of abnormal returns) for new issues after the 1933 Act. Bushee and Leuz 
(2005) find many smaller firms delisting and value increases for firms previously disclosing and those 
which started disclosing after disclosure requirements were extended in 1999 to small companies 
trading in the over-the-counter market. Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) find a 
substantial increase in value for companies affected by the 1964 Amendments that extended 
disclosure requirements to large firms trading over-the-counter. 
5 For opposing views on empirical evidence and policy, see Easterbrook and Fischel (1984), (Coffee, 
1984), Romano (1998), Choi (2000), Healy, Paul and Palepu (2001), and Zingales (2004). 
6 So-called “investor protection”—in fact, transaction protection, as rational investors cease 
transacting when foreseeing they will not be paid back—has been claimed to facilitate dispersed share 
ownership, large equity markets and entrepreneurs’ access to capital (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and 
Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 2002).  
7 Rajan and Zinagales (1998), and Castor, Clementi and MacDonald (2004).  
8 Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire also conjecture that creditor protection—including mandatory 
publication of financial statements by private companies—may be a precondition for contractual 
freedom among investors (2005: 5). Whatever the overall merits of their argument, its application to 
mandatory publication of financial statements is flawed to the extent that publication was introduced 
in continental Europe long after such flexible forms were developed (the relevant EU directives date 
from 1968 and 1978) and even most German companies do not comply with the rule (Weilbach, 
1991). 
9 Mainly Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  
10 Mainly Townsend (1979), Aghion and Bolton (1992), and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998). 
11 Jappelli and Pagano (2002), Sapienza (2002), and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007).   
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for mandatory publication of accounts. In addition to throwing light on the policy discussion 
on the regulation of accounting disclosure by private companies, the article offers three main 
contributions. First, it demonstrates that deregulation policies that focus too narrowly on 
reducing the cost of regulation may be counterproductive because they disregard the value of 
the services being provided by such regulation. Second, it complements the literature on 
mandatory financial disclosure by focusing on private companies, whereas previous studies 
have mainly focused on public companies. Third, it confirms that the main benefit of 
disclosure by private companies is that it facilitates credit transactions. Finally, the article 
provides empirical evidence supporting such beneficial effects on credit transactions.  
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyses the costs of having private 
companies make their accounts public, distinguishing direct administrative costs, possible 
distortions in competition and the erosion of privacy. It concludes that account publication is 
not prohibitively costly and that administrative costs can and should be reduced further. Some 
other costs, such as damage to competition and privacy are doubtful, especially for micro and 
small companies. Section 3 maps the appropriable benefits of having private companies 
making their accounts public. It focuses on why publication improves on asking for and 
delivering accounts for individual transactions, and shows that most demand for company 
accounts is for those of small companies. Section 4 examines the externalities of account 
publication, paying special attention to those in credit assessment and bank regulation. It 
shows the essential function that published company accounts now play in the functioning of 
credit information systems; the role of these systems in reducing the cost of credit; and the 
damage that would be caused by a reduction in account publication, as it would not only 
reduce coverage but also the accuracy of all credit risk assessments. Section 5 discusses why 
firms might lack proper incentives to publish as they do not appropriate all the benefits, due 
to information asymmetries, externalities that would not be overcome by private 
arrangements, and the survival of inefficient social norms on privacy. It also examines the 
role of governments in structuring company registries in such a way as to achieve a more 
efficient trade-off of costs and benefits and how account publication may influence cross-
border trade through its impact on the cost of credit. Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Mapping costs  
Publishing company accounts involves substantial private costs. These include the direct 
administrative cost of preparing and filing the accounts. There may be other less direct costs, 
as publication may cause a competitive disadvantage for the disclosing firms, which may 
damage their incentives to invest. A third type of private cost is the loss of personal privacy.  
2.1.  Administrative costs 
These costs are not trivial, as revealed by the lack of compliance observed when 
enforcement is lenient, as in Germany (Weilbach, 1991: 800) or The Netherlands (Bolle, 
1996). It has been argued that to avoid the costs of mandatory publication some firms are 
willing to do substantial restructuring (Barry, 2006), and publication avoidance has played a  
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role in some massive changes in organisational form (Maijoor, 1996). Furthermore, 
mandatory disclosure may also interfere in the optimal choice of safeguarding instruments 
(Gore, Sachs and Trzcinka, 2004). 
But the size of these costs is open to question, at least for most firms. First, the direct cost 
of compliance is small. The cost of preparing the annual accounts is low as the public 
accounts are now a standard by-product of any accounting software, which is in any case 
indispensable for managerial and tax accounting. Accounting software packages simply 
reorganize the data and automatically prepare different sets of accounts which follow the 
different formats required for managerial purposes, tax compliance and, when so required, 
public filing. A main reason why this holds even for micro companies is that the complexity 
of tax compliance leads entrepreneurs to purchase all these bureaucratic services, therefore 
benefiting from specialization advantages and scale economies.12 Furthermore, the cost of 
filing the accounts can and should be minimised by extending the use of new technologies 
(electronic filing13), extending the use of simplified accounts and eliminating useless 
procedures (such as notarising the signature of the company representative). In general, given 
that company accounts are not subject to any substantive review by the registry, it is 
relatively easy to automate the process.14 
Publishing financial accounts also incurs additional costs for administering and regulating 
the disclosure, as well as for filing and processing the information. To the extent that these 
services are financed by the filing firms, most of these costs are the same as those analysed in 
the previous paragraph. However, examining their structure is worthwhile because it suggests 
that even a substantial drop in account publication might reduce costs little for two reasons. 
First, investments by public registries, to make account filing possible and to manage the 
information flow, and by private firms, to capture and exploit the information, are mostly 
sunk costs and therefore irrelevant in the short run. Second, because both filing and 
exploiting the files offer substantial economies of scale. Therefore, many costs would be 
incurred anyway to serve the non-exempted firms and those which voluntarily decide to 
continue filing their accounts.  
Lastly, part of the cost savings obtained by not filing the accounts would disappear, as all 
firms would be repeatedly required to provide more specific information to different agents. 
Such demanders of information would not only be their several banks and suppliers (this 
demand could be satisfied by voluntarily disclosing), but also public agencies which would 
stop relying on the public record of accounts (if this became substantially less complete) and 
                                                 
12 The impact assessment by the Commission of the European Communities (2009b: 19) considers 
that the cost of publishing abridged accounts for a company qualifying as a “micro entity” is 1,558 
Euros, equivalent to 10 hours of a professional external accountant and added internal work 
equivalent to a 30% cost. If these accounts are provided as a by-product of the standard service 
package, this seems a gross overestimation except for the few small companies with exceedingly 
complex corporate structures.  
13 Moreover, use of the “extensible business reporting language” (XBRL) filing format, now 
permitted, for instance, by the USA’s Securities and Exchange Commission, holds the promise of 
further cost reductions (see, e.g., Hannon and Gold, 2005).  
14 The limited formal control that the register can perform may even be counterproductive. For 
example, some registers consistently check that the figures in the accounts add up, and reject them if 
otherwise. However, unbalanced accounts are probably more informative to users when they are 
trying to ascertain any unreliability in the filing firm.   
  7
would start building additional databases as well as enlarging their current demand of 
information from firms.15 Of course, national governments could avoid this new demand for 
information by implementing mandatory disclosure. However, as explained in section 5.3, the 
strength of entrenched local private interests makes it unlikely that political bodies at the 
national level would enact a rule of mandatory disclosure even if such a rule were efficient.  
2.2.  Distortion of competition 
Publication of accounts might also cause private costs to the disclosing firm by informing 
its competitors, which might also distort competition. However, this effect seems unlikely to 
be substantial when small companies are involved.16 At least, these costs are clearly smaller 
than those of the disclosure now commonly required from public companies. A useful 
comparison would be that between the impact of publicly filing the annual accounts with that 
of announcing, for instance, the cancellation of a research programme. Doubt remains on this 
point, however, not for the micro companies considered by the European Commission but for 
medium-sized or even large private companies, for which disclosure may be quite sensitive, 
given their size and presence in concentrated and differentiated markets.  
The lesser competitive effects for smaller firms are confirmed by the results of a survey 
conducted in October 2007 among Spanish users of a business information system, the 
codebook and results of which are shown in Table 1 (question 5). The survey was conducted 
by a major provider of online credit information for small firms in a large EU country. It was 
conducted online on October 25-26, 2007 by sending 74,862 emails to a random sample of 
registered users, offering each of them a free credit report (market price 13.92 €) if they 
answered the survey. A total of 5,924 users filled in the survey in 24 hours, with a response 
rate of 7.91%. Most of the respondents were small firms (Table 2). 
According to the survey, the percentage of firms which use the service to find out about 
competitors, given by the third answer, decreases significantly with the size of the user firm, 
as suggested by the differences in average use between groups of firms of different size 
(Table 1). This is confirmed by the positive coefficient obtained for the Firm Size variable in 
the econometric estimation in which the dependent variable is Competitors, a binary variable 
equal to one when the firm uses the service to gain information on competitors, zero 
otherwise (model [1] in Table 3).  
Nor does the fact that outlets in vertically integrated networks would be subject to 
different reporting requirements seem to create a significant cost difference. Franchised 
outlets publish their accounts when they are incorporated as companies, while vertically 
                                                 
15 “It is highly probable that SMEs would have to face more individual questions from public 
authorities, bankers and other stakeholders and consequently several requirements and formats will 
replace the former ones and therefore they will incur additional costs” (ECCBSO, 2007: 4). 
16 For a similar reason, the lack of separation of ownership and control in private companies avoids 
another source of costs: suboptimal decisions by managers. For public companies, surveys find that 
most managers of public companies are willing to sacrifice long-term value to smooth earnings 
(Grahan, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005). See, however, Arya, Glover and Sunder (2003), who argue that 
managed earnings may be good for shareholders.   
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integrated outlets do not need to do so when they are mere divisions of the franchising firm.17 
The potential difference in disclosure costs seems a trifle when considering that different 
rules apply to both types of vertical structures in matters such as resale price maintenance, 
collective bargaining or corporate tax rates.  
2.3.  Privacy cost 
Damage to privacy, considered as a highly significant cost by some authors (e.g., Barry, 
2006), is elusive and difficult to evaluate. The fact that most positive law does not grant 
privacy rights to corporations could be interpreted as an implicit social judgement whereby, 
overall, such privacy costs are not social costs. Two reasons may help in explaining why. 
First, a substantial part of the demand for company privacy is directed at tax evasion and 
fraud and therefore has little merit from a social perspective. Second, and closer to our case, 
it is doubtful that companies should be held to a lower standard of publicity than individuals. 
For individuals, most modern legal systems now protect privacy on financial matters but 
require publicity of the most important assets and liabilities: property rights on real estate, 
valuable movable goods, such as automobiles, and even some financial assets, as with 
holdings in public companies. Notice that publicity on real property often refers not only to 
ownership rights but also to mortgages.18 The consequence is that the most valuable assets in 
the “balance sheets” of individuals are made public. In this context, exempting legal persons 
from publicity would allow them to hide property by means of legal entities incorporated for 
the sole purpose of holding property, a practice that is already widespread in the EU for 
hiding cross-border real estate purchases from the tax authorities.  
3.  Mapping appropriable benefits 
Publication of company accounts also provides benefits to the companies involved, to 
their trading partners and to third parties. This section examines those which are appropriable 
by the disclosing company. 
                                                 
17 The difference has been pointed out by Barry (2006: 20). Arruñada, Vázquez and Zanarone (2008) 
make use of public information to observe substantial differences in performance between these 
vertical structures.  
18 The contents of the land registers are wholly open to the public in 28 of the 42 jurisdictions 
reported in UN-ECE (2000).   
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3.1.  Benefits for disclosers and their partners 
Benefits for disclosing companies and their trading partners arise from reducing the 
information asymmetry between them: publishing the accounts grants access to potential and 
current trading partners to the historical record, current financial position and profitability of 
the disclosing firm. This reduction in information asymmetry is most valuable in transactions 
that embody future obligations for the firm: clients purchasing durable goods, all parties 
investing in firm-specific assets, minority shareholders and, especially, trade and financial 
creditors. Understandably, more transparent firms have been found to incur lower costs of 
debt and equity capital.19  
Furthermore, publishing the accounts may be more credible and less costly than 
communicating them individually to contractual parties or handing them only to those parties 
who request them explicitly. Credibility is gained because filing the accounts with an 
independent third party (the registry) commits the firm, as accounts already filed cannot be 
modified and future accounts will have to be consistent with those filed in the past. This 
commitment provides value to the historical dimension of published accounts, which often is 
too summarily dismissed (e.g., Commission of the European Communities, 2009b: 17), 
disregarding the value granted to historical data in positive accounting theory (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Costs are also reduced because it is no longer necessary to deliver them 
to a high number of trade creditors, and prospective creditors or third parties will no longer 
have to ask for the accounts to be delivered to them. Let us examine this second aspect in 
some depth. 
3.2.  Individual disclosure as an alternative to public disclosure  
The alternative solution proposed by the European Commission is for the creditor to ask 
for the borrowers’ financial statements. This solution is problematic, not least because there 
are often more than two parties to the transaction. 
Information provided to a party in a one-to-one interaction is often less credible than that 
provided to all potential parties by filing it in a public registry. Some evidence on this is 
given by the common practice in banking of, as a first step, checking loan applications 
(which often include specifically adapted financial statements) against reports prepared by 
                                                 
19 As modelled, among many others, by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and shown empirically, e.g., 
by Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2005), using firm-level data, and Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker 
(2003), using country-level data, as well as Hail (2002) and Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005). Good 
quality in financial reporting has been associated with lower price declines in financial crises, 
according to Mitton (2002), in the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, and to Barton and Waymire (2004), in the 
1920s. See, however, Leftwich (2004). It has also been observed that companies enjoy lower cost of 
credit after selling shares for the first time to the public, with the disclosure that this implies (Pagano, 
Panetta and Zingales, 1998). Similarly, bond yields are lower in USA states that have mandated 
GAAP disclosure, especially among organisations with relatively higher information asymmetry 
(Gore, 2004).   
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business information agencies.20 One may assume that if some credit applicants make up 
their accounts when dealing with banks, they are even more likely to do so when dealing with 
suppliers, given that suppliers are not experts in credit evaluation, do not have such ready 
access to additional information and are less likely to be a party in future transactions.  
In addition, asking contractual parties for sensitive information is not always a sensible 
negotiating strategy, because it may destroy trust, which might be needed to adapt the 
transaction in the future. It may force the transaction to be more formal and legalistic. This 
seems especially important when making credit decisions as by-products of commercial 
transactions, many of which need future adaptation. On the other hand, explicit contracting 
for safeguards is relatively more common and accepted for credit than for commercial 
transactions, and fewer adaptations are needed.  
Evidence on commercial practice supports the claim that asking parties directly is not 
sensible. Suppliers often obtain sensitive information from their banks and from other firms, 
instead of directly from their clients. They thus avoid offending the client and probably gain 
more reliable information. Prevalence of this practice is confirmed by the responses given in 
the survey to question 8 (Table 1): 47.16% of respondents rely on their banks and 41.83% on 
references from other firms to find out about the solvency of their clients and commercial 
partners (with 68.30% relying on banks or other firms and 21.07% on both).  
Furthermore, the European Commission assumes that only two parties intervene in the 
credit transaction. However, as the previous example illustrates, it is often the case than there 
are more than two parties to the transaction, and the third party—the bank in the example—is 
not in a position to ask the prospective borrower for information. Instead, the bank will first 
check its own records if the prospective borrower is a bank client, and will always examine 
the external databases for information on the borrower’s financial, judicial and tax status. If 
the buyer is not a bank client, the only independent information comes from such external 
databases. Asking the borrower’s bank is out of the question in a competitive banking 
environment because of the twin risks of being misled or losing the transaction.  
A similar situation arises when a bank lends against receivables. In many cases, the bank 
will not be willing to discount notes receivable from a client without first evaluating the 
creditworthiness of the maker or drawee (often the bank client’s client). If the drawee is not a 
client of the bank, the bank can hardly request this party’s accounts, and the bank will decide 
based on the information available from external sources, mainly credit agencies. The 
availability of information allows the bank to identify that the drawee is a good risk and on 
this basis the bank lends to its own—by assumption, less solvent—client. (To benefit more 
directly from his creditworthiness, the good risk purchaser can enter into a “confirming” 
agreement with his banks by which the bank will pay suppliers before their debts are due). 
Lastly, even more serious difficulties arise when contracting for factoring, invoice 
discounting or credit insurance agreements, because the factor or the insurer need information 
on multiple firms: usually all their client’s customers. Both factoring and credit insurance are 
only producible on the basis of previous screening of borrowers, using databases compiled or 
produced by insurers who carefully examine both potential insured clients and borrowers.  
                                                 
20 For information on this and other practices mentioned in different sections of the paper, see, on 
checking creditworthiness, http://www.payontime.co.uk/collect/collect_creditworthy.html; about 
understanding credit rating, http://www.payontime.co.uk/collect/collect_understand_ratings.html; and 
about reducing risk, http://payontime.co.uk/collect/collect_riskreduce.html (visited October 5, 2007).   
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3.3.  Small companies do benefit from publishing their accounts 
The European Commission bases its proposal on the belief that there is little demand for 
the financial statements of micro entities and small companies.21 But this belief is proved 
wrong by examining the actual demand for the accounts of micro and small companies filed 
in public registries. For primary demand, Table 4 in the Annex summarises the size 
distribution of companies whose accounts were requested by final users at the Spanish 
Company Registry: 95.43% of the total requests are for accounts of micro entities and small 
companies, the two main potentially exempted categories (42.90% and 52.52%, respectively). 
For secondary demand, Table 5 summarises the SABI database, commercialised by Bureau 
va Dijk, which purchases its data on Spanish companies from Informa D&B S.A., which in 
turn purchases the raw data from the Spanish Company Registry. Of all companies in this 
database, 96.05% are micro entities or small (48.81% and 47.25%, respectively). Moreover, 
the size distribution of companies in this database approximates reasonably well the size 
distribution of demand for three reasons. First, Informa and Bureau va Dijk are commercial 
operators, and are therefore unlikely to pay for and store useless data. Furthermore, over 
2006-2007, final users requested information on 99.6% of small private companies included 
in the databases of the three main credit information agencies operating in the Spanish 
market, according to its trade association (ASEDIE, 2007: 4). Lastly, the SABI database also 
approximates final demand because of the way in which credit information agencies have 
built up these databases over time. Every year, they purchase from the Registry data on 
companies on which they have reported in previous years and process it. With every final 
user request for accounts not yet in the database, the agencies purchase such accounts but also 
update their annual demand for the future—therefore, they also update the composition of the 
database. In this case, after 15 years of updating, the database offers a picture of demand 
which is sufficiently accurate for our purposes. Certainly, information is requested by final 
users on some companies more than on others, but this bias is not only related to size but also 
to other factors, such as payment delays and insolvency.22  
In fact, it is likely that small firms benefit more from massive credit information systems 
based on mandatory disclosure than, at least, large and even medium-sized firms.23 This is 
because the size of large firms makes it sensible for financial analysts and even the press to 
                                                 
21 In particular, the Commission states that “there is a lack of broad demand” for accounts of micro-
entities, (2007: 8) and that those of small companies “are used by a limited number of stakeholders, 
such as credit institutions and suppliers that have the possibility to require financial information from 
the company” (2007: 17). Its later impact assessment repeats the mistake (2009b: 16-18).  
22 The demand for information on small companies can also be inferred from the massive nature of 
the demand for this type of information. In the first nine months of 2007, information on 1,933,220 
different firms —as identified by their tax ID numbers—was requested at least once from one 
database in one EU country. Considering the size distribution of firms in the economy, it is clear that 
the bulk of this demand consists of information on micro and small firms. Such massive demand is 
also in line with the communication strategies that these agencies are following: e.g., an online 
provider specialising in small firms has recently run advertising campaigns at prime time on main 
national radio networks.  
23 The additional difficulties suffered by a regime of voluntary disclosure for small firms, as analyzed 
below, make this consistent with the empirical correlation found between firm size and voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Raffournier, 1995; Giner, 1997; Depoers, 2000).  
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spend resources monitoring them and reporting on them. Also, large firms deal with large 
numbers of contractual parties, and these act as powerful information networks. Small firms, 
by contrast, are unknown outside their own small circle. Credit information systems make it 
possible to use the reputational capital developed in this small circle when interacting with 
strangers. They therefore make possible the sort of anonymous trade that is often considered 
essential for economic growth.24  
Our survey of users of the leading business information service in Spain is consistent with 
the claim that small firms benefit the most from the publication of accounts (Table 1, 
question 1). First, a vast majority of firms (88.77%) use the system to know about micro and 
small companies, as defined by the European Commission. Only 11.23% use it for obtaining 
information on larger companies. Second, accounts are by far the most valuable piece of 
information they obtain (83.69% of users valued them), followed afar by judicial incidents 
(54.95%) and corporate information (31.35%). Ready access to the accounts of small 
companies is therefore the key value added by this service.  
The econometric analysis confirms these results. When regressing a binary variable 
representing a Large firms answer to the first question of the survey, which asks respondents 
if they usually consult the system to get information on large or small firms, the estimated 
coefficient for the Firm Size variable is significantly positive (model [2] in Table 3). This 
means that larger user firms are more likely to obtain information on large firms. 
Furthermore, a similar result obtains when firm size is measured in terms of the discreet 
categories proposed by the European Commission.  
The Commission’s disregard for the demand for financial information and its value is 
understandable because the benefits of publishing the accounts have increased dramatically in 
recent years, thanks to recent changes in information technologies. First, the development of 
scanners and OCR (optical character recognition) software made it possible to introduce the 
accounts in computerised databases. More recently, the Internet has granted universal access 
to such databases at low cost. The novelty of these changes makes it likely that many of the 
potential benefits have not yet been fully realised, as is the case with information 
technologies more generally.  
The Commission’s disregard might also be explained by the focus of academic research 
on public companies. It is surely true that small firms would not benefit from the type of 
disclosure now required from public companies, which has been adapted to reduce 
information asymmetry in equity transactions (both in new sales of securities and between 
managers and shareholders in companies with dispersed ownership) and therefore requires 
more sophisticated and higher-quality information. However, there is demand for lower 
quality information on small private companies. Two pieces of evidence support this claim. 
First, the market demands lower quality financial reporting from private than from public 
companies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Second, when statistical methods are applied for 
assessing credit risk, the risk of smaller and private companies is estimated using statistical 
and discriminant methods, such as the one pioneered by Altman (1968). However, the risk of 
public companies is more often estimated with structural and reduced-form models that rely 
on market prices of the debtor’s securities, particularly the Merton 1974 model (De Servigny 
and Renault, 2004: 63-116). In short, information provided by filing small private companies’ 
accounts is of low quality, but useful and in demand.  
                                                 
24 See, for instance, North and Thomas (1973), Granovetter (1985), and Seabright (2004).   
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4.  Mapping externalities 
Every time a company publishes its accounts, it benefits third parties in ways that could 
hardly compensate the disclosing company in any practical way. Aggregated information on 
small individual firms, even if their size is well below the thresholds in the European 
Commission’s proposal, is valuable for credit information agencies, to improve the accuracy 
and predictive power of their credit rating models; for analysts and investors, as it allows 
them to do comparative analysis when allocating capital among firms and industries; for 
competitors and competitors’ investors, when analysing the industry; for regulators and 
policymakers, when making decisions; for central banks, when evaluating the level of 
indebtness of the economy and the soundness of banks; and even for researchers doing 
empirical work. In addition, one may expect these effects to also indirectly benefit other 
economic agents, both at the micro and macroeconomic levels. This is the case, in particular, 
with credit information, bank regulation and national accounting.  
The importance of these externalities for credit markets makes it advisable to use credit 
variables in defining account publication rules. In particular, when drawing up differential 
mandatory rules, the thresholds and conditions defining which firms should make their 
accounts public should include a measure of firms’ credit volume rather than only generic 
size variables, such as the ones used by the European Commission to define the thresholds in 
its proposal (assets, sales and employment), which are not directly related to credit.  
4.1.  Externalities in credit information 
Financial information agencies produce reports containing all sorts of information that is 
of use for evaluating companies’ creditworthiness. These reports, which may be customised 
depending on the needs of the client, often include several years of accounts as filed at the 
Company Registry and the identity of the companies’ shareholders and legal representatives. 
In addition, not only for companies but also for individual firms, reports might also include, if 
available, negative information about previous defaults, as filed by trade and financial 
creditors and courts, as well as contact information and news clips on the firm. As a 
summary, they may also offer a credit rating or even an estimated probability of default.25 
The accounts filed with the Company Registry are a major component of these credit reports, 
because of the problems plaguing alternative sources of information. Exclusive reliance on 
negative information about credit defaults worsens the quality of credit assessment, and 
financial institutions are often unwilling to share positive information on debtors (Powell et 
al., 2004). Furthermore, even sharing arrangements depend on the cooperation of established 
financial institutions, which poses serious risks to competition.26  
 
                                                 
25 See two descriptions of the services offered by two leading firms in Spain at 
http://www.informa.es/infornet/Main/idioma/01/idioma/01/screen/SShowPage/pagina/infoeconomica.
html and http://www.iberinform.es/Servicios/InfEstandarIber+.htm (visited October 2, 2007). 
26 See, e.g., in the case of Spain, TDC (2005).   
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4.1.1.  Information externalities 
Voluntary publication of accounts endangers the key services provided by these agencies. 
If a substantial number of companies were to stop publishing their accounts, this would not 
only reduce the coverage of services for such companies, but would also impoverish 
information at the industry level and, more important, would worsen the assessment of credit 
risk for all companies in the economy. Let us see why.  
Obviously, reports on private companies that would stop filing their accounts would 
hardly contain any financial information. Their credit risk would therefore be badly 
estimated. However, these effects would be trivial to the extent that they would be limited to 
the firm which would also be receiving the savings from not filing.  
This full “internalisation” of damages would not occur in the two other effects, for which 
the non-publisher would still benefit from having other firms publishing the accounts. With 
less publication, all sorts of aggregate information about sectors of economic activity, as well 
as the firms in a state, region or town, would be less reliable. In addition, and worst of all, the 
ability to assess the credit risk of the firms that still publish their accounts would suffer 
because such assessment would be based on a smaller and possibly biased sample. Smaller, 
because some companies would not publish their accounts and biased, because the companies 
that decide not to publish them may share certain characteristics, making it more or less likely 
for them to publish. For instance, worse risks might be less inclined to publish. Firms not 
publishing their accounts would therefore be free riding on those publishing them. This 
would include even those with no debt if exempted from complying with the rule of 
mandatory publication.   
In a context of costly publishing, this free riding opens the door to the possibility that 
fewer and fewer firms will continue publishing, and the information produced will become 
increasingly less valuable, triggering a vicious circle. We can glimpse its effects from a 
similar and better-known case: reliance on negative information by credit bureaus. Even for a 
company filing its accounts, less comprehensive filing of accounts by other companies will 
probably bring similar consequences to those of constraining the use of positive information 
by credit bureaus specialising in consumer credit. With less information on file, the accuracy 
of their credit risk scoring models decreases. Consequently, credit becomes more costly and 
less available, banks face more difficulties for monitoring indebtedness and established 
creditors enjoy new barriers to entry, as shown by Barron and Staten (2003).  
4.1.2.  Competition externalities 
Public availability of financial accounts improves the flow of credit-risk information, 
allowing suppliers and other potential creditors to evaluate credit risk by themselves without 
previous interaction with or personal knowledge of the potential debtor, and without resorting 
to intermediaries (mostly banks) who may hold such knowledge. It is understood that the 
more precise pricing of risk makes more transactions possible and improves the allocation of 
resources. 
Furthermore, lesser asymmetry of information expands the type and number of potential 
lenders and risk bearers, which otherwise would be limited to the banks and suppliers which  
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had contracted with the debtor firm in the past and developed personal knowledge about its 
creditworthiness.27  
Such expansion takes place in several markets and dimensions, with substantial 
competitive effects. New transactions are made possible, including second party lending by 
suppliers—trade credit without discounting, which amounts to disintermediating the banks—
and third-party lending and risk partitioning. New participants can enter local, regional and 
national markets, from credit rating agencies to banks, factoring firms and credit insurers 
without branches in those markets.28 Many of these new participants are thus able to operate 
across borders, as foreign suppliers, lenders, informers and insurers can now rely more on 
objective, impersonal information. Within the financial industry, small banks become more 
capable of competing with large banks. Lastly, small firms in all markets are slightly more 
capable of competing with large firms, because they now have better access to the credit 
rating services which previously were less available to them than to large firms. The latter 
were anyway in a position to develop their own services for assessing credit risk.  
Our survey of Spanish users of the main business information system is consistent with 
these claims (Table 1, questions 2, 7, 5 and 6), as they declare they use its services for 
granting credit to new clients (60.42% of users) and closing sales that otherwise would not be 
carried out (45.97%). Furthermore, more respondents use the information for new 
relationships of special significance (47.99%) and all new relationships (37.02%) than to 
monitor old relationships, whatever their importance. Its role in sales and credit decisions is 
also clear from the high proportion of users relying on it for getting information on clients 
(85.96%) and for deciding about sales on credit (66.95%). The resulting pattern of uses 
supports our claim that access to company accounts—the information that respondents value 
the most—expands trade opportunities and eases entry into new markets. Furthermore, 
econometric analysis finds that it is smaller firms that are most likely to use the information 
to grant credit to new clients (model [3] in Table 3).  
4.2.  Externalities in banking regulation 
Financial institutions increasingly rely on external measures of credit risk to assess the 
value and riskiness of their loan portfolios, partly as a consequence of the Basel II guidelines 
which require a radical restructuring of how they assess credit risk, allowing them to use 
external credit assessments.29 Credit information systems are key for applying these Basel II 
                                                 
27 This sort of “relationship banking” plays an important role in different models of the banking firm, 
from, e.g., Benston and Smith (1976) to Freixas and Rochet (1997).  
28 Credit insurance relies heavily on credit information services, and the two activities are vertically 
integrated in many firms: the market leader on the Spanish market was created by a credit insurer 
(Informa, 2007), and the main French credit insurer acquired a credit information firm in 2004 to 
become the leader on the French market (Coface, 2007). 
29 “The Committee permits banks a choice between two broad methodologies for calculating their 
capital requirements for credit risk. One alternative, the Standardised Approach, will be to measure 
credit risk in a standardised manner, supported by external credit assessments…. In determining the 
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approaches in that they help to analyse if credit provisioning is adequate, to assess capital 
requirements and to evaluate concentration and related lending. They thus contribute to our 
understanding of portfolio credit risks of both individual financial institutions and whole 
financial systems (Powell et al., 2004). 
Credit rating agencies have even developed risk assessment systems that automatically 
assess risk for small private companies. For instance, Moody’s “RiskCalc” models estimate 
one-year and five-year probabilities of default for European private companies relying on 
their financial statements. By providing a ready measure of private company credit risk, these 
systems allow better-informed credit decisions.30 More important, being automatic, they 
make it possible to evaluate, monitor and adjust the risk of lenders’ portfolios in a matter of 
minutes. Experts can then focus on the high-risk loans that the model has identified as such. 
Trade and regulation are also made easier by having a single measure of risk (Kogacil et al., 
2003; Moody’s KMV, 2007).  
Since 2003, Moody’s has adapted such models to the particular characteristics of the 
following European markets: Germany, Spain, France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The datasets used to build 
these RiskCalc models are from companies smaller than the thresholds finally proposed by 
the European Commission: e.g., the model for Nordic Europe includes companies with more 
than €0.1m in total assets; for the UK, those with more than £0.1m in total assets; for most 
other EU countries, those with turnover greater than €0.5m.  
Furthermore, despite being well below the European Commission’s thresholds for micro 
entities, RiskCalc thresholds are relatively high when considering that many banks apply 
them to firms of all sizes. RiskCalc models omit micro companies because, in order to use the 
models as stand-alone tools, they rely fully on quantitative data. However, the credit rating 
systems developed and applied internally by banks typically make use of both qualitative and 
quantitative data, so that for micro companies they can balance the lower accuracy of their 
quantitative data by giving more weight to qualitative data (on, e.g., management quality or 
succession plans). Apparently, banks find it informative to complement such qualitative data 
with quantitative data, mainly the published accounts of even the smallest companies. 
Considering this extensive use of micro and small private companies’ accounts, a 
reduction in the number of firms filing them would make estimating credit risk substantially 
more difficult because defaults are rare, a fact that already calls for using data from the last 
few years when estimating default probabilities. In particular, to the extent that smaller firms 
would cease filing reports, the thresholds for the models relying purely on quantitative data 
would be raised, and their coverage would consequently be reduced. The size of the EU and 
USA RiskCalc datasets gives us a glimpse of the likely change. As a consequence of the EU 
rule of mandatory publication of accounts by private and not only public companies, the 
European adaptations of the model rely on the accounts of many more companies than in the 
USA. Whereas, for example, the French model is based on 297,000 firms and the Spanish 
model is based on 140,790 firms, the USA model is based on only 40,000 firms. 
                                                                                                                                                        
risk weights in the standardised approach, banks may use assessments by external credit assessment 
institutions recognised as eligible for capital purposes by national supervisors” (BIS, 2006: 19). 
30 Not only for deciding on loan applications but also for establishing more precise risk premiums 
and even establishing market transfer prices for loans made by parent companies to their subsidiaries.   
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Considering that most of large banks’ risk—about 50-60%—is credit risk, with market 
and operational risks taking the remainder (Kuritzkes, Schuermann and Weiner, 2003), 
reducing the set of information has serious consequences for assessing banks’ risk. It is 
therefore understandable that the European Committee of Central Balance Sheet Data Offices 
should have reacted strongly against the EC’s proposal, considering that, in this new 
regulatory context, “the availability of an accounting and reporting framework that meets the 
requirements of banks is a cornerstone of a successful implementation of the new European 
prudential framework” (ECCBSO, 2007: 2).31  
4.3.  Externalities in national accounting 
When building the financial accounts of national economies, many central banks rely 
partly on the financial statements of non-financial firms, mainly to produce information on 
their financial operations. Some countries have developed specific databases of accounts, to 
which firms send their accounts voluntarily, getting in return privileged access to aggregate 
information on their industry and the economy.  
But participation tends to be low and suffers from several biases—e.g. large firms are 
more inclined to participate. This makes it necessary to complement the analysis of their own 
databases with the accounts of small companies. For instance, the Bank of Spain’s database, 
which contained only 8,923 accounts in 2004, used for this purpose the accounts of 441,859 
small companies filed at the Companies’ Registry (Banco de España, 2006: 190). Without 
mandatory disclosure, it is doubtful how many of these accounts would be available.  
5.  Who should balance costs and benefits?  
We have seen in previous sections that deciding on the publication of accounts—both 
whether to publish them or not and which contents to publish—entails costs and benefits. We 
will consider in this section alternative ways of trading off such costs and benefits: decisions 
by individual companies, both independently and through private collective arrangements, 
and government intervention to mandate publication and standardise the information to be 
published. 
                                                 
31 The ECCBSO was set up in November 1987 on the initiative of several European central banks 
and the European Commission to “to improve the analysis of company data through the exchange of 
information, comparison of analytical methods and joint studies. It is composed of institutions from 
twelve European Union Member States and European Commission and OECD” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/bachdatabase_en.htm, visited on October 14, 2007).   
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5.1.  Do firms balance costs and benefits well? 
Voluntary decisions by rational decision makers may deviate from the optimal trade-off 
of costs and benefits for two main reasons: the asymmetric structure of the information 
available and the presence of externalities. In addition, this balancing of costs and benefits 
may also be hindered when the decision maker deviates from rationality. 
5.1.1.  Information asymmetry constraints 
In situations of information asymmetry, parties who are better informed may tend to 
voluntarily disclose their information to uninformed parties to avoid their inferring the worst 
and reacting accordingly, withdrawing their cooperation or taking precautionary measures 
(Grossman, 1981; Grossman and Hart, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). Some evidence on the 
presence of incentives for voluntary disclosure by private firms is provided,32 for instance, by 
the common practice of credit rating agencies, of using as an indicator of creditworthiness the 
fact that a company keeps all sorts of registrations up to date: from its listing in the telephone 
directory to its file in the company register. 
But informed parties may not disclose the information when one of the following 
assumptions does not hold: (1) When disclosure is costly, the possibility that uninformed 
trading parties will infer the worst from nondisclosure does not necessarily provide enough 
incentives to disclose (Jovanovic, 1982; Verrechia, 1983; Dye, 1986). (2) For the same 
reason, a similar outcome arises when it is not publicly known if the supposedly well 
informed party is in fact well informed or not (Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985; Farrell, 
1986; Shavell, 1994). (3) When not all uninformed parties understand the information, their 
lack of understanding may limit the benefits of disclosure for good firms and firms may end 
up in a nondisclosure equilibrium (Grossman, 1981; Fishman and Hagerty, 2003). (4) When 
the informed party cannot disclose all information (for instance, because it would have to 
prepare several sets of financial statements using different principles, which would be 
prohibitively expensive), a rule constraining disclosure choice will increase the value of the 
disclosed information (Fishman and Hagerty, 1990).  
For disclosure of financial statements by private small companies, three of these 
assumptions do not hold, hindering voluntary disclosure. First, disclosure is costly, which 
may deter voluntary disclosure and cause confusion in the signal sent by non- disclosure. 
Second, it is public knowledge that companies have financial statements, which they use for 
their own management, so the second assumption does not hold. Third, some market 
participants do not fully understand the accounts. Fourth, mandatory accounting principles 
are needed to increase the value of the information by limiting discretion.  
Our survey of users of the main business information service in Spain supports the claim 
that the signal sent to potential trading partners by not filing is ambiguous (Table 1). Of all 
respondents, 57.43% consider it a bad sign if a company has not filed its accounts. However, 
41.58% do not conclude anything because they agree there may be many reasons for not 
publishing the accounts. Consequently, they simply try to gain additional information. 
                                                 
32 Evidence for public companies was given in n. 19.   
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Certainly, a majority of respondents considered failure to file as a bad signal.33 However, our 
respondents are a subsample of the population of economic agents using these information 
systems. Moreover, they are judging the failure to file in an environment of mandatory filing, 
in which failure to file is not prevalent among active companies (informal estimates run from 
10 to 20%). One could assume that their judgement would be more lenient under voluntary 
filing, mirroring greater ambiguity of failing to file. The consequence would be fewer 
incentives to file.  
5.1.2.  Difficulties for internalising externalities 
The most important reason for suboptimal disclosure is the presence of externalities: 
firms lack incentives to voluntarily disclose the optimal amount of information, given that 
they internalise some but not all the social benefits of disclosure.34 Furthermore, the use of 
computers and the Internet has increased the value of these externalities by making it possible 
to aggregate the information in the accounts and to distribute the information to millions of 
users more cheaply and promptly. 
However, the presence of externalities does not necessarily require a public solution. In 
the spirit of Coase (1960), we need to examine the comparative performance of mandatory 
disclosure as compared to voluntary disclosure under alternative solutions, such as private 
sector collective agreements that may internalise externalities in unorganised voluntary 
disclosure and offer the potential advantage of being more adaptive.  
In particular, information intermediaries can be developed by firms and industry 
associations to process firms’ information, allowing externalities to be obtained but 
minimising the costs for the firms themselves. Such intermediaries can produce aggregate 
indicators for the industry or even partial indicators for individual firms without disclosing 
sensitive information: for instance, they can rate firms’ solvency without disclosing detailed 
information, as done by the “RiskCalc” system in the USA, as explained in section 4.2.  
These private arrangements are less viable, however, for private than for public 
companies. Their operation depends for their success on firms’ cooperation and it is likely 
that a greater number of firms will make it more difficult for them to agree and enforce their 
agreements on sharing information. For smaller firms, such information intermediaries either 
                                                 
33 Unreported regression analysis shows that larger firms are more benign when interpreting failure to 
file the accounts, whereas older firms and those which file their accounts earlier in the year tend to 
give a worse rating to firms which have failed to file theirs. 
34 This goes even for authors that are generally sceptical about the overall merits of financial 
regulation. For example, Zingales considers that “we can identify three areas where intervention is 
needed. First, in the area of disclosure: companies tend to have too little incentive to disclose” (2004: 
40). (In some circumstances, however, firms may also disclose too much information [Fischman and 
Hagerty, 1989].) Some other rationales for mandatory disclosure, such as protecting small investors 
or increasing confidence in capital markets, enjoy less unanimous support in the literature. Compare, 
e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel (1991: 296-300) with the studies cited in n. 6. We skip discussion of 
these studies here because they do not apply to private small companies, which do not sell securities 
in the market and, given their small size, the reputational effect of their eventual failure or fraudulent 
behaviour would in any case be very limited.   
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fail to exist or tend to provide incomplete and inaccurate information for a lower number of 
firms, as illustrated by experiences such as that of RiskCalc in the USA (section 4.2) or the 
Bank of Spain (section 4.3).  
In particular, voluntary arrangements suffer a serious self-selection bias if firms in 
distress are more likely not to cooperate.35 This is potentially damaging because statistical 
models for assessing credit risk rely on a relatively small number of defaults. And this is not 
the only bias in the willingness to provide information. For example, financial institutions are 
often willing to build private databases with negative information on payment but they are 
less willing to share positive information, probably because they do not want to risk losing 
their good clients. However, including positive information significantly improves the 
estimation of credit risk, leading to access to credit for more borrowers when positive 
information is included (Powell et al., 2004).  
Considering these factors, it seems that voluntary disclosure might work better for private 
large companies than for private small companies, because both the costs of disclosure may 
be larger and the benefits easier to reach by voluntary disclosure for large private firms than 
for small private firms. Many large private firms produce differentiated products and are 
active in concentrated markets, so disclosure is more likely to damage their competitive 
position. Also, with a small number of firms it is easier to overcome collective action 
problems and reach industry-wide externalities by agreeing to voluntary disclosure. On the 
contrary, small firms are more often in competition. And there are often huge numbers of 
them in any industry, making such voluntary agreements much more difficult to reach and 
enforce.  
5.1.3.  Deviations from rationality  
So far, we have been assuming that companies are able to rationally evaluate the costs 
and benefits of publishing their accounts. Let us now consider some possible deviations from 
rationality.  
First, companies are not individuals. Therefore, rational calculation by managers may 
lead to irrational decisions by their firms if managers’ interests are misaligned with those of 
shareholders in maximising the value of the firm. This is a serious problem for companies 
with separation of ownership and control. In fact, many discussions on mandatory disclosure 
focus on the conflict between managers and shareholders, and try to elucidate how mandatory 
regulation may affect their ability to contract for optimal disclosure. It is a minor problem, 
however, for small private companies, given that for them we can confidently assume little 
separation between ownership and control.  
Second, we could argue that manager-owners of private small companies are not always 
capable of correctly weighing the costs and benefits of publishing their accounts. There is no 
doubt that many of them often fail in this (and many other) calculations. Cognitive research 
has discovered many systematic biases in decision-making. For instance, in this area, one 
could easily imagine the possible presence of “status quo bias” hindering adaptation to the 
fact that the Internet has made credit information easier to aggregate and circulate, therefore 
                                                 
35 As suggested by the finding that firms doing well disclose more (Lang and Ludholm, 1993).   
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enhancing benefits. Also, especially for micro companies wishing to file, an external 
mandatory rule can save them a cost in terms of exerting self-control. Nonetheless, whatever 
the importance of these biases, it is unclear what role should be taken by the government in 
easing them, mainly because decision makers in government also suffer similar biases and 
private decision makers often have better incentives for learning how to overcome them.36  
Third, individuals may be perfectly rational in evaluating costs and benefits but may be 
pressured by maladapted social norms to behave in accordance with the norm. This may 
happen, for instance, if the norm imposes additional costs (e.g. a reputational loss) on those 
who do not comply with it.37 Bainbridge (2000) argues that a social norm of suboptimal 
disclosure—rooted in herding and conformity behaviour—may define a bad collective 
equilibrium of low voluntary disclosure in a financial market. In such situations, a rule of 
mandatory disclosure could take society to a hopefully more efficient equilibrium.  
The argument is important because the financial markets of many member states, 
especially the new member states of the EU, are emerging markets with closely-knit business 
communities in which privacy is still a predominant social norm.38 Under the pressure of this 
social norm, it is less likely that mandatory disclosure would be promulgated by the state, if 
given the freedom to decide. Furthermore, it is also less likely that companies would 
voluntarily disclose optimally.39  
5.2.  Do governments balance costs and benefits better than firms? 
Firms’ inability to produce externalities, especially when these are as substantial as those 
existing today regarding credit information, makes a mandatory rule of account publication 
potentially efficient. But this efficiency hinges on the actual ability of government to both 
minimise costs and maximise benefits. Mandatory publication would not be efficient if the 
                                                 
36 Moreover, cognitive arguments open the door to explanations in all directions. For instance, Arya 
and Mittendorf explain, on the basis of herding behaviour amongst third-party information providers, 
why voluntary disclosure may benefit the discloser even though the information directly benefits 
competitors, by guiding the information gathering and dissemination amongst these third parties. 
“Roughly stated, the infusion of early precise information can have a domino effect on followers, 
leading to a consensus view that does a poor job of reflecting the diversity of information” (2005: 
232).  
37 The aversion to disclosure in Chinese business circles was weighted when exempting small 
companies from publication in Hong Kong (SCCLR, 2000: 195).  
38 The importance of this emerging-markets dimension of the problem is compounded in the light of 
the evidence provided by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleiter (2007) who show that in less developed 
countries credit volume depends relatively more on the ex ante availability of information on debtors’ 
quality than on the strength of creditors’ rights.  
39 Different social norms are in place within the EU in many areas, one such being payment periods 
and payment delays (Arruñada, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), which have led to the issue of Directive 
2000/35/EC to combat late payment in commercial transactions and achieve greater harmonisation in 
the internal market.  
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costs of filing the accounts are disproportionate nor the system is structured in a way that 
does not ensure reliability or does not allow utilisation of the information in the public files.  
Company registries are the key agencies responsible for this efficiency, as they are the 
recipients, holders and primary issuers of account information. Even company registers 
which are less active in checking the legality of corporate transactions need to be reliable 
with respect to the date of filing and the storage of the accounts. To avoid potential damages 
to their parties, registries’ independence is preserved by granting them a monopoly position, 
so that companies cannot choose a “register of convenience” (Arruñada, 2003). 
Understandably, this monopoly position often makes it harder to reduce the cost of filing the 
accounts and enhance the value of the information.40  
The key element is the efficient functioning of electronic systems for filing and retrieving 
information, not only on an individual basis but also in batches, thus allowing the operation 
of filing and information intermediaries who compete in developing well-adapted interfaces 
with users. Because there is a substantial fixed component in the cost of filing, in order to 
reduce the cost of filing for small firms they should be allowed to file through their 
accountants and other providers of tax, legal and administrative services, without any specific 
involvement of the companies’ legal representatives. In addition, costs can be reduced by 
unifying the different accounts to be filed for different purposes, or at least establishing 
standards that allow accounting software to produce different sets of accounts automatically 
for different purposes.  
5.3.  If government, which government? Cross-border effects of credit 
information services  
Even though the Commission of the European Communities considers that “harmonised 
accounting requirements are needed for cross-border investments and company operations 
also for many small companies” (2007: 15), it does not make explicit its view on the cross-
border effect of companies’ publication of accounts. Given the Commission’s proposal to 
exempt micro companies from mandatory publication of accounts, it seems, however, to 
implicitly assume that this exemption would not entail relevant cross-border effects. In 
particular, it seems to assume that effects on transparency for third parties are only relevant 
for the mobility of companies but not for the mobility of goods and services.  
Both assumptions are doubtful, as many micro and small private companies are involved 
in cross-border trade. According to the last row of Table 5 in the Annex, 4.65% of micro 
companies and 16.29% of small companies are involved in cross-border trade. These micro 
                                                 
40 The need for a speedy register is clear when considering that cost and value are in conflict: more 
recent accounts are more informative for users but filing sooner is also costlier for filers. This trade-
off is illustrated by the failure of the 2006 UK Companies Act to substantially reduce the filing 
period. The final wording of section 442 shortened it from 10 to 9 months for private companies. 
However, the White Paper for the UK’s Company Law Reform Bill of 2005 had proposed to reduce 
filing times to 7 months because, according to small business organisations, the increase in costs 
“would not adversely affect work patterns…. [and] be of benefit to third-party small company users 
of those accounts” (DTI, 2005: 281).  
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and small companies do benefit from the increased transparency provided by a harmonised 
policy regarding publication of accounts. As examined above, such benefit comes both 
directly, by offering access to the accounts, and indirectly, by facilitating greater 
development of information systems that assess and report on private companies’ credit risk. 
It is also revealing that in our sample users of a Spanish business information system, we find 
that firms more involved in cross-border trade tend to use the information more to grant 
credit to both new and old clients, and to sell in new regions (models 3 to 5 in Table 3).  
In essence, the beneficial effects of account publication on the cost of credit apply more 
to small firms in cross-border than in domestic transactions because for domestic transactions 
banking networks provide a palliative solution but for cross-border transactions there are no 
international banking networks at the retail level. Imagine a Swedish bank buying bills of 
exchange or entering into a factoring agreement with a Swedish client who is supplying a 
Portuguese customer on credit. For the bank and its client, information on the credit rating of 
the foreign partner is hard to obtain because Swedish banks have little retail activity in 
Portugal, if any. Information from the published accounts and from the reports provided by 
credit information agencies services that heavily rely on them is therefore more valuable for 
smaller than for larger companies.  
This effect may seem irrelevant because the current volume of cross-border trade by 
micro firms is small. However, the important question is why it is small and how to reduce 
the barriers that keep it small. The discussion leading to the adoption of the Directive on 
payment delays throws some light on this, as exporters in Nordic countries complained 
persistently about how unreliable Southern European firms were in matters of both payments 
and delays (Arruñada, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). In such a context, the availability of standardised 
information that allows good risks to distinguish themselves from bad risks is important for 
competition (and even for ascertaining the truth in potentially damaging stereotypes).  
Certainly, this argument supports mandatory publication only to the extent that private 
incentives are insufficient, especially for cross-border trade by small firms, given its currently 
incipient level. These small foreign trade pioneers produce positive externalities for their 
competitors in the same industry, region and country. Therefore, their incentives to start are 
suboptimal, including their incentives to take the necessary steps, such as more open 
disclosure. Furthermore, for such pioneer firms the costs of disclosure might be substantial if 
disclosure damages their competitive position in the—initially more important—domestic 
market. A collective action trap may find firms in a bad equilibrium in which no firm is 
willing to pioneer because most profits would accrue to its competitors.  
Moreover, Member States could try to avoid this trap by imposing mandatory publication 
at the national level. That is, in our example, the Portuguese Government would impose 
mandatory publication on Portuguese firms, so solving their collective action problem. 
Proximity to Portuguese firms might help in evaluating their costs and benefits but might also 
bias the political consideration of any costs and benefits. In the end, political decisions also 
depend on the relative strength of the different interests in place, whatever their merit from a 
public perspective. To the extent that mandatory publication would increase competition in 
the Portuguese market (by, for instance, facilitating credit for importers), it is easy to imagine 
that many agents might oppose it based on their private interests, even though it is socially  
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beneficial.41 In general terms, it is unclear which level of government— European or 
national—is better placed to reach market-enhancing decisions on this issue.42  
In fact, decision rights on this issue are shared amongst European and national institutions 
in a way that, given their interests, probably allows them to make the best use of available 
specific information (Hayek, 1945). European decision makers, who are more interested than 
national ones in developing cross-border competitive markets, are probably well placed to 
pursue the benefits of this policy, whereas national decision makers may be more influenced 
by its costs. The current system allocates decision rights on benefits to Brussels regarding 
which accounts are published by whom, but decision rights on costs to national governments, 
which implement and manage the account filing systems whose performance determines the 
level of most costs.  
6.  Concluding remarks 
The analysis of costs and benefits in this article advises caution about proposals on the 
scope of mandatory publication of private company accounts. In contrast, it indicates the 
advisability of policies that aim to reduce costs and enhance value through administrative 
reforms of filing, archive and retrieval systems. In so doing, they would exploit the 
possibilities that new information technologies offer to use the accounts in assessing the 
credit risk of even micro firms, therefore reducing their cost of credit and expanding trade 
opportunities.  
Publishing accounts does cause administrative costs, but these are not high and can be 
reduced further by electronic filing. Other costs, such as possible distortions in competition 
and the erosion of privacy are immaterial or doubtful, especially for micro and small 
companies. First, the cost to the disclosing firm of informing its competitors seems unlikely 
to be substantial when small companies are involved. Damage to privacy is elusive and hard 
to evaluate because most positive law does not grant privacy rights to corporations. 
Moreover, much of the demand for company privacy is directed at tax evasion and fraud, and 
therefore has little merit from a social perspective.  
On the other hand, publishing accounts lessens information asymmetry with other firms. 
This effect has always been present but has become stronger due to credit information 
systems based on computerised databases and universal Internet access. Status reports based 
on these systems are thus reducing the cost of credit for small firms, enhancing competition 
in product and credit markets, and expanding trade and specialisation. Furthermore, small 
companies are the main beneficiaries of these credit information systems, as shown by two 
figures: about 95% of both their primary and secondary demand is for information on small 
                                                 
41 Easterbrook and Fischel admit that competition among USA states cannot produce optimal 
solutions in the presence of interstate effects (1991: 295, 300-2, 304-5): some states would tend to be 
holdouts to benefit their firms. 
42 In addition, the presence of sunk costs may also motivate substantial rent-seeking activities. (Or, 
more precisely, “quasi-rent-seeking” activities). It might therefore be more wasteful to apply the 
subsidiarity principle in this area, whatever the decision taken by the European Union.   
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companies; and in our survey 89% of final users declare they use such systems to find out 
about small firms.  
Moreover, publishing company accounts produces substantial externalities, especially in 
credit assessment and financial regulation, because firms do not internalise all the benefits of 
publishing their accounts. Private arrangements are unlikely to reach an acceptable 
production of such externalities, especially for small firms and due to the collective action 
problem inherent in such a massive number of firms. Most of the externalities would 
therefore be lost in a regime of voluntary publication. Consequently, credit risk assessments 
would cover fewer firms and would be less accurate even for the firms that do publish their 
accounts, posing an acute free-riding problem.  
Overall, it seems viable for governments to structure company registries to achieve a 
more efficient trade-off of costs and benefits than would be possible with a regime of 
voluntary publication.  
In addition to throwing light on the policy discussion on the regulation of accounting 
disclosure by private companies, this article contributes to different strands of economics, 
accounting and finance. First, the article shows once again that deregulation policies that 
narrowly focus on reducing the cost of institutional arrangements may be counterproductive 
when they disregard the value of the services being provided. Second, by focusing on private 
companies, the article complements the literature on mandatory financial disclosure, which 
has mainly focused on the effects that financial disclosure by public companies exerts on 
equity transactions. Third, it also confirms that the main benefit of disclosure by private 
companies is to reduce information asymmetry in credit transactions. This suggests that the 
opportunities and regulatory problems involved are more of the type posed by credit bureaus 
than those of conventional corporate disclosure, which is more oriented to stock market 
transactions. Lastly, compared to the literature on mandatory financial disclosure by public 
companies, the article suffers from the lack of stock market prices, which makes it well nigh 
impossible to measure effects on firm value. The article, however, provides survey evidence 
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Annex 
Table 1. Survey questions and responses by customers of the online credit information service   
  Usually consult information about: 
 
All % 
Large firms  Small firms 
1. You usually consult this information to:             
Get information on large firms (those with, approximately, more than 50 
workers, 4.4 million Euros of assets and/or 8.8 millions of turnover) 
665  11.23%       
Get information on small and medium-sized firms (all other)  5,259  88.77%         
No  answer  0  0.00%       
2. What advantages does your firm get from having access to this information? (Mark one or several responses): 
Carry out sales that otherwise would not do  2,723  45.97%  332  49.92%  2,391  45.46% 
Grant credit to new clients  3,579  60.42%  349  52.48%  3,230  61.42% 
Grant more credit to old clients  1,174  19.82%  137  20.60%  1,037  19.72% 
Sell in regions where we had not sold before  848  14.31%  106  15.94%  742  14.11% 
No  answer  175 2.95% 21  3.16% 154 2.93% 
3. What information do you value most about a firm? (Mark one or several responses): 
Accounts (balance sheet, profit and loss accounts)  4,958  83.69%  566  85.11%  4,392  83.51% 
Judicial  incidents  3,255 54.95%  305  45.86%  2,950 56.09% 
Corporate information (board, site, legal address, register data)  1,857  31.35%  223  33.53%  1,634  31.07% 
Contact  data  1,035  17.47%  114 17.14%  921 17.51% 
Other  478 8.07% 46  6.92% 432 8.21% 
No  answer  19 0.32%  2  0.30%  17 0.32% 
4. How do you interpret the fact that a company on which you are inquiring has not filed its accounts at the Company Registry? 
The firm is unreliable and its default risk is greater  3,402  57.43%  388  58.35%  3,014  57.31% 
I do not conclude anything because there are many reasons for not 
publishing the accounts. I try to get additional information. 
2,463 41.58%  269  40.45%  2,194 41.72% 
No  answer  59 1.00%  8  1.20%  51 0.97% 
5. You use our services to get information on… (mark one or several responses): 
Suppliers  1,513 25.54%  205  30.83%  1,308 24.87% 
Clients  5,092 85.96%  558  83.91%  4,534 86.21% 
Competitors  2,501 42.22%  309  46.47%  2,192 41.68% 
Other  595 10.04%  50  7.52% 545 10.36% 
No  answer  35 0.59%  5  0.75%  30 0.57% 
6. You use our services to decide about… (mark one or several responses): 
Purchases  and  supplies  927 15.65%  133 20.00%  794 15.10% 
Sales on credit  3,966  66.95%  416  62.56%  3.550  67.50% 
Marketing  research  1,622 27.38%  214  32.18%  1.408 26.77% 
Studies and analysis  2,112  35.65%  273  41.05%  1.839  34.97% 
Other  633 10.69%  56  8.42% 577 10.97% 
No  answer  59 1.00%  8  1.20%  51 0.97% 
7. How do you use our services? (Mark one or several responses): 
For new relationships of special significance  2,843  47.99%  341  51.28%  2,502  47.58% 
For all new commercial relationships  2,193  37.02%  237  35.64%  1,956  37.19% 
To monitor old relationships of special significance  1,772  29.91%  229  34.44%  1,543  29.34% 
To monitor old relationships  1,121  18.92%  111  16.69%  1,010  19.21% 
Other  957 16.15%  111 16.69%  846 16.09% 
No  answer  77 1.30%  7  1.05%  70 1.33% 
8. Which other methods do you use to gather information on solvency of clients and other commercial partners? 
Their history of payments with our firm  3,152  53.21%  355  53.38%  2,797  53.19% 
Information provided by my bank  2,794  47.16%  297  44.66%  2,497  47.48% 
References of other firms  2,478  41.83%  252  37.89%  2,226  42.33% 
Other  1,175 19.83%  138  20.75%  1,037 19.72% 
No  answer  64 1.08%  10 1.50%  54 1.03% 
Notes: The survey was conducted online on October 25-26 by sending 74,862 emails to a random selection of (confidential number 
omitted) registered users, offering each of them a free credit report (market price 13.92 €) if they answered the survey. A total of 5,924 
users filled in the survey in 24 hours, with a response rate of 7.91%.   
  34 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the econometric analysis 
All firms  Micro firms  Small firms  Large firms 
Variables 
Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max Obs  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min Max 
Data obtained from the 
database: 
                                    
Workers  5593 38.08  377.63  1.00 23,229.00 1583 25.41  87.83 1.00  1,656.00  3087  38.64 272.04 1.00  10,000  549  72.00 995.27 1.00  23,229 
Assets  4565  4,006 17,500 1  428,000  1269  2,997 11,500 1  264,000 2542  4,081 16,000 1  364,000 463  4,759 20,100 5  324,000 
Turnover  4509 4,633  21,100  0  641,000  1259 3,317  9,355  0 190,000  2509  4,838  19,700  0 587,000  457  5,695  29,500  7 597,000 
Log of Workers  5593 2.25  1.36  0.00 10.05  1583 2.16  1.30 0.00  7.41  3087  2.28  1.37 0.00 9.21  549 2.38  1.36  0.00 10.05 
Log of Assets  4565 13.75  1.66  6.27 19.87  1269 13.61  1.62  6.86 19.39  2542 13.82 1.64  6.27  19.71  463 13.89  1.66  8.42 19.60 
Log of Turnover  4509 14.03  1.61  4.90 20.28  1259 13.89  1.56  4.90 19.06  2509 14.09 1.62  6.14  20.19  457 14.15  1.59  8.88 20.21 
Firm Size Indexa  4507  0.00  1.56 -5.97  7.13  1259  -0.14  1.49 -5.36  5.54  2508  0.06 1.58  -5.97  7.13  456  0.14 1.56  -4.43  5.84 
Cross Border Index  5866 0.57  1.04  0.00 3.00  1671 0.50  0.98 0.00  3.00  3217  0.61  1.07 0.00 3.00  570 0.72  1.14  0.00 3.00 
Log of Firm Age  5856 4.92  0.71  1.79 7.22  1669 4.85  0.72 2.40  7.17  3212  4.95  0.70 1.79 7.14  567 5.02  0.70  2.40 7.08 
Data obtained from  
the survey: 
                                    
Sales  5924 0.58  0.49  0.00 1.00  1691 0.59  0.49 0.00  1.00  3245  0.57  0.50 0.00 1.00  572 0.57  0.50  0.00 1.00 
Marketing  5924 0.17  0.37  0.00 1.00  1691 0.17  0.38 0.00  1.00  3245  0.16  0.37 0.00 1.00  572 0.17  0.38  0.00 1.00 
Finance  5924 0.60  0.49  0.00 1.00  1691 0.59  0.49 0.00  1.00  3245  0.61  0.49 0.00 1.00  572 0.59  0.49  0.00 1.00 
Competitors  5924 0.42  0.49  0.00 1.00  1691 0.40  0.49 0.00  1.00  3245  0.43  0.50 0.00 1.00  572 0.42  0.49  0.00 1.00 
Large firms  5924 0.11  0.32  0.00 1.00  1691 0.10  0.30 0.00  1.00  3245  0.12  0.32 0.00 1.00  572 0.10  0.30  0.00 1.00 
Grant credit to new clients  5924 0.60  0.49  0.00 1.00  1691 0.60  0.49 0.00  1.00  3245  0.61  0.49 0.00 1.00  572 0.62  0.49  0.00 1.00 
Extend credit to old clients  5924 0.20  0.40  0.00 1.00  1691 0.18  0.39 0.00  1.00  3245  0.20  0.40 0.00 1.00  572 0.20  0.40  0.00 1.00 
Sell in new regions   5924 0.14  0.35  0.00 1.00  1691 0.15  0.35 0.00  1.00  3245  0.13  0.34 0.00 1.00  572 0.15  0.36  0.00 1.00 
Notes: The Firm Size index is built as a principal component of the number of workers and the amount of assets and turnover in 2005.  
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Table 3. Econometric analysis 
Dependent variables (estimated equations in columns) 
The user consults the service to obtain 
information on:  
Advantages that the user firm obtains 
from having access to the information:  
Competitors  Large firms  
(usually) 
Grant credit to 
 new clients 
Extend credit to  
old clients 
Sell in new  
regions 
Q5.A3  Q1.A1  Q2.A2 Q2.A2 Q2.A2 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Firm Size index  0.087*** 0.217***  0.043***  0.023  -0.015 
  (0.014) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) 
Cross Border Index  0.041** 0.014  0.072*** 0.081*** 0.109*** 
  (0.019) (0.024)  (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) 
Log of Firm Age  -0.023 -0.121*** 0.094***  0.030  -0.072* 
  (0.035) (0.045)  (0.035) (0.039) (0.044) 
Sales  0.089* -0.191*** 0.237*** 0.161*** 0.092 
  (0.046) (0.062)  (0.047) (0.052) (0.057) 
Marketing  0.468*** 0.180***  -0.177*** -0.026  0.322*** 
  (0.054) (0.069)  (0.054) (0.061) (0.062) 
Finance  0.207***  -0.190*** 0.288*** 0.313*** -0.027 
 (0.046)  (0.061)  (0.047) (0.053) (0.056) 
Constant -0.309*  -0.448*  -0.465** -1.333***  -0.912*** 
 (0.181)  (0.233)  (0.183) (0.205) (0.225) 
Observations  4506  4506  4506 4506 4506 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.0278  0.0575  0.0190 0.0152 0.0179 
Probit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (Qx.Ay): numbers of corresponding 
questions and answers in the survey.   
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Table 4. Number of company accounts requested from Spanish company registries 
Potentially exempted companies 
Micro entities  Small companies 
Medium and large  
companies that could not be 
exempted by national law 
 






N < 10  446  10 ≤ N < 50  164  N ≥  50 24 634 
Total assets, A  A < 0.5 m €  319  0.5m € ≤ A  
< 4.4 m € 
253  A ≥ 4.4 m €  62  634 
Turnover, T  T < 1 m €  405  1 m € ≤ T  
< 8.8 m € 








thresholds to be 
a micro entity  272 
Meeting at least 
two of the three 
criteria to be 
small, or two of 
the three upper 
bounds to be 
small and not 
meeting at least 
one required to 
be a micro entity  333 
Not meeting the 
three upper 
bounds to be 
small, or 
meeting only 
one of the upper 
bounds to be 
small  29 634 
Percentage of  
total  companies    42.90%   52.52%   4.57%  100.00% 
Source: Registries of Ciudad Real, Palma de Mallorca and Valladolid.  
Accounts requested from the 24th to the 28th of September, 2007.   
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Table 5. Estimation of the number of Spanish companies whose accounts have been reported by the Spanish 
Company Registry to Informa D&B S.A. and which would be affected by the exemption proposed by the 
European Commission, indicating the proportion in each size group that do cross-border trade 
Potentially exempted companies 
Micro entities  Small companies 
Medium and large  
companies that not exempted 
by national law 
 






N < 10  328,871  10 ≤ N < 50  112,693  N ≥ 50  19,120  460,684 
Total assets, A  A < 0.5 m €  352,275  0.5m € ≤ A  
< 4.4 m € 
207,013  A ≥ 4.4 m €  50,672  609,960 
Turnover, T  T < 1 m €  442,181  1 m € ≤ T  
< 8.8 m € 
132,722  T ≥ 8.8 m €  19,896  594,799 
 Meeting  the 
three bounds  
to be a micro 
entity 222,422 
Meeting at least 
two of the three 
criteria to be 
small 115,039 
Not meeting the 
three upper 
bounds to be 
small 10,189   
    
Meeting at least 
two of the three 
upper bounds to 
be small and not 
meeting at least 
one required to 
be a micro entity  100,263 
Meeting only 
one of the upper 
bounds to be 
small 7,791   
Estimated number 
of companies in 
each size group    222,422   215,302   17,980b 455,704 
Percentage of  




in each size group    10,338  35,081   9,024  54,443 
Percentage of 
companies with 
cross- border trade 
in each group 
 
4.65%   16.29%  50.19%  11.95% 
Source: SABI online database, provided by Bureau va Dijk with data from Informa D&B S.A., on the limited liability companies with full data for financial 
year 2005. Note: a Availability of data differs between categories mainly because the number of employees is missing for a substantial number of 
observations, given that reporting on this number is not mandatory. As a consequence of this missing data, the number of micro-entities is likely to be 
underestimated. For instance, if instead of using the number of employees, we had used a salaries threshold, the number of micro entities would have 
been 305,582 considering micro entities to be companies that in 2005 paid less than 300,000 € in salaries, and 289,001 considering companies that 
paid less than 200,000 € in salaries. b In addition, 12,862 of these companies are medium-sized and “have no particular external user” (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2007: 17).  